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ABSTRACT
The Naval Air Systems Command commissioned the E-2C Hawkeye Group II
Mission Computer Replacement Program and tasked Air Test and Evaluation Squadron
Two-Zero and the E-2C Integrated Test Team to evaluate the integration of the form, fit,
and function of the OL-698/ASQ Mission Computer Replacement (MCR) for
replacement of the Litton L-304 Mission Computer in the E-2C Group II configured
aircraft. As part of the life cycle support of the E-2C aircraft, the MCR configuration
fields a new, more reliable Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) hardware system and
preserves the original software investment by emulating the existing Litton Instructional
Set Architecture (LISA) legacy code.
Incorporating Northrop Grumman Space Technology’s Reconfigurable Processor for
Legacy Applications Code Execution (RePLACE) software re-hosting technique, the
investment in the LISA software is maintained. Conducting developmental test of robust
software systems, such as the MCR and its associated software, provided dramatically
different challenges than traditional developmental testing.
A series of lessons were learned through particular discrepancies and deficiencies
discovered through the six month flight test period. Specific deficiencies illustrate where
proper planning could ease the difficulties encountered in software testing. Keys to
successful developmental software tests include having the appropriate personnel on the
test team with the proper equipment and capability. Equally important, inadequate
configuration management creates more problems than fixes. Software re-programming
can provide faster fixes than traditional developmental test. The flexibility of software
programming makes configuration management a challenge as multiple versions become
available in a short amount of time. Multiple versions of software heighten the risk of
configuration management breakdown during limited amount of available flight tests.
Each re-programmed version potentially fixes targeted deficiencies, but can also cause
new issues in functional areas already tested. Inherently, regression testing impacts the
schedule. Software testing requires a realistic schedule that the author believes should
compensate for anticipated problems. Data collection, reduction, and analysis always
prove to be valuable in developmental testing. A solid instrumentation plan for data
collection from all parties involved in flight tests, especially data link network tests, are
critical for trouble shooting discovered deficiencies.
Software testing is relatively new to the developmental test world and can be seen as
the way of the future. Software upgrades lure program managers into a potentially cost
effective option in the face of aging avionics systems. With realistic planning and
configuration management, the cost and performance effectiveness of software upgrades
and development is more likely to become realized.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
“Forty years ago we spent our efforts building multiple versions of aircraft that
would go faster, higher and farther. Now we build one aircraft and for about 20 years we
transform the systems on it,” stated LCDR Denis Tri, U.S. Naval Test Pilot School
instructor (Buhlman, 2005). Transformations include adding new systems and capability,
and replacing or modifying older ones. Software and software engineering
predominantly drive the transformations and modern systems. In the U.S. Naval carrier
aviation, only 2 current airframes will continue to be built—the F/A-18 Hornet and E-2C
Hawkeye. The E-2C Hawkeye Group II is a prime example of modern technology
upgrades to old airframes.
The E-2C Group II Mission Computer Replacement Program (GrIIM RePr) Integrated
Product Team (IPT), which was comprised of Navy and industry partners, implemented
an innovative software reuse approach resulting in the successful rapid development,
testing, and fielding of the MCR. The lessons learned from the developmental test of the
reused/re-hosted software integrated in the replacement of the L-304 Mission Computer
for the E-2C Group II Navigation Upgrade and Non-Navigation Upgrade is the focus of
this thesis.
The E-2C Hawkeye Group II is an all-weather carrier and shore-based Airborne Early
Warning (AEW) tactical command and control aircraft whose capabilities include
identifying, tracking and classifying all hostile, neutral and friendly contacts. The E-2C
Hawkeye conducts Over the Horizon (OTH) early warning and provides a timely,
accurate and complete surveillance picture to Carrier Strike Group commanders and
participating platforms for tactical decision making. The E-2C is heavily involved in
multiple missions including Strike Warfare, Communications/Intelligence, CounterNarcotics, Anti-Submarine Warfare, Air Defense/Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile, Surface
Search Coordination/Anti-Surface Warfare, Space and Electronic Warfare, and Search
and Rescue, shown in figure 1.
AIRCRAFT NOMENCLATURE
In 1973, the E-2C Group 0 made its debut with the Litton L-304 Mission Computer.
In 1988, the E-2C Group I delivered a new radar system which required an Enhanced
High Speed Processor (EHSP) addition to the L-304. In 1991, the E-2C Group II brought
additional detection sensor improvements in radar and Identification Friend or Foe (IFF)
systems and were able to quickly report multiple contacts of interest with the addition of
data link systems. In 1997, the Group II received a navigation suite upgrade that
included dual laser ring gyro inertial systems and dual Multi-Functional Control and
Display Units (MFCDU). In 2000, the Mission Computer Upgrade (MCU) and
Advanced Control Indicator Set (ACIS) combination was installed in the Group II
aircraft. The MCU/ACIS combination was the same set designed to go into Hawkeye
2000, which debuted in 2002 with an additional Cooperative Engagement Capability data
link. There are currently 6 distinct versions of the E-2C Hawkeye, each with various
upgrades depicted in table 1.
1

(Northrop Grumman, 1997)
FIGURE 1: E-2C HAWKEYE MULTI-MISSION CAPABILITIES

TABLE 1: E-2C HAWKEYE VERSIONS

Group 0
IOC1
Radar
IFF1
PDS1
Mission
Computer
Station
Display
Data Links

1973
AN/APS-138
APX-72
ALR-73

Group I
1988
AN/APS-139

Main Display
Unit
-

L-304 &
EHSP
Monochrome
-

-

-

L-304

Group
II

Group II
(Navigation
Upgrade)

1991
1997
AN/APS-145
APX-100
L-304 & EHSP2
Enhanced Main Display
Unit (EMDU)
Link 16, Link 4A, Link 11

Group
II
(MCU/
ACIS)
2000

Group II
(Hawkeye
2000)
2002

ALQ-217A
Mission Computer
Upgrade (MCU)
Advanced Control
Indicator Set (ACIS)

Cooperative
Engagement
Capability
ASN-139 Navigation Suite (2 sets)
Global Positioning System (GPS)
-

-

-

ASN-92/50 Navigation Suite
Engines
T56-A-425
T-56A-427
1. Initial Operating Capability (IOC), Identification Friend or Foe (IFF), Passive Detection System (PDS)
2. The L-304 & Enhanced High Speed Processor (EHSP) mission computer in the Group II Navigation
Upgrade and Non-Navigation Upgrade mission computer was targeted for replacement.
Navigation
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LITTON L-304 MISSION COMPUTER OBSOLESCENCE
Since 1973, the E-2C has used the Litton L-304 as the tactical mission computer.
The L-304 was a real-time, 6 MHz dual-processing mission computer using Litton
Instructional Set Architecture (LISA) language, non-volatile core memory, with an
enhanced array associative coprocessor. The LISA language was a dedicated design for
the E-2C mission. The L-304 system weighed 700 lbs, consisted of 188 integrated Shop
Replaceable Assemblies (SRA) producing 1,700 watts of heat, and required 2.5 minutes
boot up time. The L-304 tactical mission computer has become obsolete, having reached
its maximum processing potential and memory capacity, thus inhibiting the ability for
integrating modern, more advanced Command, Control, Communication, Computer,
Intelligence, and Surveillance (C4IS) weapons systems. A low Mean Time Between
Failure (MTBF) of 129 hours, combined with high maintenance costs, warranted a
replacement of the L-304 system.
Faced with obsolescent parts and chronic system failures, the E-2C Group II Mission
Computer Replacement Program (GrIIM RePr) was created was to improve reliability
and reduce total ownership costs with a Form Fit Function (F3) Mission Computer
Replacement (MCR) using available Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) NonDevelopmental Item (NDI) technology in an open systems architecture, shown in figure
2.

Litton L-304 Mission Computer

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

188 Shop Replaceable Assemblies (SRA)
700 lbs
1700 watts
MTBF < 129 hours
CPU load time > 2.5+ minutes
100% dedicated assembly code
Obsolete, customized Hardware
3 level organic support
Large obsolescence problem

GrIIM RePr Mission Computer

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

4 Weapon Replaceable Assemblies (WRA)
170 lbs
80 watts
MTBF > 15,000 hours
CPU load time < 30 seconds
Software upgrades in C++
Open Architecture Level 3 systems, COTS
Hardware
• Organizational to Original Equipment
Manufacturer (OEM) logistics support
(Northrop Grumman, 2004)

FIGURE 2: GRIIM REPR OBJECTIVE
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CHAPTER 2: AIRCRAFT AND SYSTEMS OVERVIEW
E-2C GROUP II HAWKEYE
The E-2C Group II Hawkeye is an integral component to Carrier Strike Group
operations. Northrop Grumman manufactures the aircraft, which is powered by two
Allison T-56-A-427 engines and four-bladed Hamilton Sunstrand propellers. Eightbladed propellers are currently being installed on fleet aircraft. Distinguishing
characteristics of the E-2C Group II Hawkeye include its 24 foot diameter rotating
radome and its hydraulically powered and mechanically folded wings that allow it to fit
on board an aircraft carrier. Aircraft dimensions are provided in figure 3.
The aircraft contains a crew of five: Pilot, Copilot, Combat Information Center
Officer (CICO), Air Control Officer (ACO), and the Radar Officer (RO). Together the
crew operates sophisticated detection sensors such as the AN/APS-145 radar, OL-483
Improved Identification Friend or Foe System (IIS) and the ALR-73 Passive Detection
System (PDS). The aircraft’s mission computer integrates these sensors, which enables
the E-2C to provide early warning, threat analyses, and command and control efforts
against air and surface targets within approximately three million cubic feet of airspace
and over 150,000 square miles of ocean surface. As the dynamic tactical picture
develops, aircrew utilize six VHF radios (three of which are VHF and UHF capable), two
HF radios, and Satellite Communications (SATCOM) to provide voice and data link
reports to the parties requiring the information the E-2C aircrew see and hear. The on
board data links (Link 4A, Link 11 and Link 16) relay the E-2C tactical picture and
associated data via radio frequency without using voice communications.
Maximum aircraft takeoff weight is 55,000 lbs to include 12,400 lbs of fuel. On
station time is approximately five hours. Currently the E-2C is incapable of in-flight
refueling. A more detailed description of the E-2C Hawkeye can be found in the E-2C
Naval Aviation Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) Flight
Manual, reference 1.
MCR DESCRIPTION
The Mission Computer Replacement (MCR) substitutes the L-304 in terms of form,
fit, and function. It reutilizes original cables, wiring and software, but replaces all of the
cabinets and computer processors. The MCR supplements the original software with
more contemporary software provided by Northrop Grumman’s Reconfigurable
Processor for Legacy Applications Code Execution (RePLACE) technology.
HARDWARE
The MCR, shown in figure 4, consists of two cabinets: the computer terminal control
cabinet and the digital computer cabinet. The majority of the computer terminal control
cabinet is hollow, while the top portion contains the Removable Mass Storage System
(RMSS) device, Built In Test displays, and a control panel assembly to interface with the
4

(NAWCAD GrIIM RePr Test Plan, 2004)
FIGURE 3: E-2C HAWKEYE AIRCRAFT
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Circuit Card Assemblies
Transient Holdup Module
Power Supply Module
Serial Display I/O
Module
PowerPC Dual
Processor Single
Board Computer
EHSP Legacy
Virtual Machine
(LVM)
L-304 AND
DDBC Legacy
Virtual Machine
(LVM)

Computer
Terminal
Control

Digital
Computer
Cabinet

(NAWCAD GrIIM RePr Test Plan, 2004)
FIGURE 4: MCR HARDWARE LOCATION
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operator. The digital computer cabinet contains four Computer Circuit Assemblies
(CCA) with the following functions:
Single Board Computer. This Computer Circuit Assembly contains dual Power PC 7410
microprocessors with integrated dual redundant MIL-STD-1553B, dual Standard
Computer Serial Interface (SCSI), and Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
(TCP/IP) interfaces. It supports a real time clock, a Peripheral Computer Interface (PCI)
bus, and a test interface. The Reconfigurable Processor for Legacy Applications Code
Execution (RePLACE) L-304 and EHSP Legacy Virtual Machines (LVM) provide the
core software emulators.
a. A single processor emulates the original L-304 processors that process data link
radar, IFF, PDS, display, navigation and 1553B data bus data.
b. A second PowerPC emulates the L-304 EHSP.
2. Serial/Display Module. This CCA combines the discrete, analog, synchro, high speed
serial, Link 4A and Link 11 interfaces required for the MCR Input/Output (I/O).
3. Power Supply Module. This CCA converts direct power to the MCR.
4. Transient Hold-up Module. This CCA provides stored power to all components of the
MCR when there is a loss of aircraft power for at least 300 milliseconds.
SOFTWARE
Northrop Grumman’s Reconfigurable Processor for Legacy Applications Code
Execution (RePLACE) software technology, uses commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
PowerPC processors to emulate the E-2C legacy Mission Computer processors and
electrical interfaces. RePLACE creates a software environment to run the legacy software
and updated software programs, creating a Dual Instruction Set Computer (DISC)
environment. RePLACE technology software hosts and reuses the original Operation
Flight Program (OFP) to emulate the original Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) without
modification. The DISC software environment consists of three primary components
shown in figure 5: the legacy instruction set engine, the input/output (I/O) mapping
software, and the virtual component environment.
The Litton L-304 operated in a 16-bit software environment. The RePLACE software
environment is a 32-bit software environment that allows more data to process faster. To
reuse the L-304 software in the 16-bit environment with the faster 32-bit environment,
RePLACE had to incorporate an interface file, termed a “thunk” file.”

7

(RePLACE Technology, Northrop Grumman, 2004)
FIGURE 5: REPLACE SOFTWARE ENVIRONMENT

Thunk files, defined by The Jargon file (Version 4.4.7), allow older 16-bit software
environments function with modern 32-bit software environments. “Thunking” is the
process of switching between 16- and 32-bit environments. Thunk files also skip older
software instructions that are no longer valid for the MCR system. The insertion thunks
are used to modify the operation of the OFP and to provide the operator feedback on
legacy operations that are no longer permitted. Thunk file versions are identified by the
two letter designation at the end of the EIOS software versions.
The legacy software OFP in RePLACE receives commands and responds faster on a
more accessible cache memory provided by the COTS microprocessor. The upgraded
Instruction Set Engine computes and processes data. The Emulator I/O software, with
thunk files, bridges the Litton Instructional Set Architecture and new architectures. The
original mission computer had four processors: the A and B mathematical processors, the
Digital Data Bus Controller (DDBC), and Enhanced High Speed Processor (EHSP). The
MCR uses one processor to emulate the A and B, and Digital Data Bus Controller
processors and a second processor to emulate the Enhanced High Speed Process.
Specific software versions that were tested are listed in table 2 and additional
RePLACE technology descriptions can be found in Appendix A.
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TABLE 2: MCR SOFTWARE UTILIZED DURING THE TEST PERIOD.
Group II
(Navigation
Upgrade)

Name

Group II

Vx-Works Real-Time (RT) Operating
System

5.4.2

5.4

RT-L304 Emulator

2.3.1

2.02

RT- Enhanced High Speed Processor
(EHSP) Emulator

2.3.2

2.3.2

1.5.0.AI
1.6.2 AM
1.6.2.AM
1.7.5.AQ
1.7.5.AR
Legacy L-304 Operation Flight
N9MFHDDD
J9VEUCBA
Program*
N9QFLDDD
* Multiple software versions listed were tested during the flight test
period. The current U.S. Navy fleet operates with upgraded OFP
and EIOS software versions.
Emulator Input/Output Software
(EIOS) Emulator*
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
GENERAL
Prior to flight test, the RePLACE software completed Manufacturer Qualification
testing and Navy Independent Validation and Verification (IV&V) by the Software
Support Activity (SSA) in Point Loma, California. The SSA has traditionally provided
OFP software support and upgrades, such as data link features, for the E-2C Group II
community. Fleet released OFPs are validated and verified with a simulation and
stimulation lab at the SSA prior to fleet use. The GrIIM RePR Integrated Product Team
(IPT) lead considered the IV&V test results of their OFP and Northrop Grumman’s
RePLACE software and deemed the software combination mature enough for aircraft
installation and flight test.
As a functional replacement, the primary focus of the flight test efforts was to verify
legacy functions were still operating correctly. While the original test objectives were
based on specific software functional requirements, the Developmental Test team made
every effort to consider the operational environment in which the MCR would eventually
operate. Developmental Test is designed to verify and validate specific requirements,
while Operational Test verifies the system is suitable and effective for the aircraft’s
mission and the environment it will be used in. The MCR test efforts included combined
Developmental Test and Operational Test due to the similar flight profiles and test
objectives, and the limited flight assets available. The Developmental Test planned
events were able to satisfy the specification verifications and the Operational Test team’s
critical operations issues and key performance parameters.
TEST CONFIGURATIONS
The MCR was designed to replace the mission computer in both the E-2C Group II
Navigation Upgrade and the E-2C Group II Non-Navigation Upgrade, hereafter referred
to as simply the E-2C Group II. The Developmental Test squadron only had one E-2C
Group II Navigation Upgrade configured aircraft in its inventory (A/C 294). Test plans
made provisions to request an E-2C Group II aircraft (A/C 601) from an operational fleet
squadron when the team had confidence in the system as installed in the E-2C Group II
Navigation Upgrade aircraft.
GROUND TESTS
Ground and preflight checks consisted of physical installation and system functional
checks. Physical installation testing included verifying the MCR fit in the L-304 space
on the aircraft. Functional testing validated all operator interfaces, instrumentation,
limited data link capabilities, and other functional capabilities that could be verified
outside a flight environment.
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FLIGHT TESTS
MCR performance and system integration was evaluated during specific flights
dedicated to particular avionics systems. Most of the test flights were conducted in the
Patuxent River Restricted Areas 4006 and 4008 and the Working Areas 72 and 108. All
flights were flown within Naval Aviation Training and Operating Procedures
Standardization (NATOPS) limits, in an operational fleet mission profile.
NAVIGATION
MCR navigation solutions were evaluated in normal and degraded modes. Aircraft
GPS and navigation solutions were used as truth data. The MCR computed navigation
solution, which is integrated with the avionic sensors, is not necessarily the same as the
aircraft navigation solution.
DETECTION AND TRACKING
There are three detection sensors onboard the E-2C that are integrated with the
mission computer. The radar, IFF, and Passive Detection systems themselves were not
under test, however their data processing, integration, and report to the operator were.
Radar and IFF
Radar and IFF detection and tracking in the over water, over land, and littoral areas
were evaluated using Learjets (35 and 36 series) as test targets on planned flight profiles.
Radar and IFF detections were isolated from one another for independent post flight
analysis. The Learjets carried an Ashtech Differential Global Positioning System
(DGPS) for instrumented positional truth data. Mode II and III/C transponders were used
to evaluate IFF reports.
Passive Detection System (PDS)
The Atlantic Test Range (ATR) operated multiple emitter sites with planned emitter
signatures that the PDS was designed to detect. When the E-2C operators/testers
requested particular emitters to radiate, their reported location, direction of arrival, and
time to detect were evaluated.
DATA LINK
The E-2C gathers plenty of tactical and strategic information that enables operators to
effectively provide command and control. Often, a majority of the information the E-2C
gathers is required and shared with other battle space members via data links. The data
links provide integrated sensor information to the Carrier Strike Group, Combined Air
Operations Center and strike fighter aircraft instantaneously. Track identification and
location are examples of information provided on the data links. Other information
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included on the data link picture are Force Orders, which provide decisive commands
such as engage, destroy, or return to base to other data link participants. Link 11 is
primarily used as a surveillance link, providing the overall big tactical picture. Link 4A
is primarily an air intercept data link shared between command and control platforms and
strike fighter aircraft. Link 16 was more recently developed than Link 11 and Link 4, and
is used as both a surveillance and air intercept data link.
External Assets
Data link tests were more involved than the isolated onboard sensor integration tests.
Data link tests required external assets to confirm accurate and timely message
transmission and reception between platforms.
Data links were evaluated using the following mission representative platforms
located at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland:
F/A-18 C/D Hornets - F/A-18 C/D aircraft were designed to be all-weather carrier and
shore-based attack and fighter aircraft used to perform strike, interceptor, close air
support, combat air patrol, and anti-surface warfare missions. The F/A-18 utilized during
MCR tests were equipped with Miniaturized Information Distribution System (MIDS)
were used to evaluate Link 16 Air Control. MIDS is a Link-16 compatible system,
smaller in physical size to fit in strike fighter aircraft. Non-MIDS equipped F/A-18
aircraft were used to evaluate Link 4A.
E-2C Hawkeye 2000 (HE2K) van - The HE2K van was a mock E-2C Hawkeye 2000
configured system that simulated another airborne E-2C in the Link-11 and Link-16 data
link networks. It utilized the Mission Computer Upgrade and Advanced Controller
Indicator Set (MCU/ACIS), which are employed in the E-2C Hawkeye 2000. The E-2C
HE2K van consists of an E-2C mission avionics suite contained in a transportable semitrailer that housed a single Advanced Control Indicator Set (ACIS) display, and
VHF/UHF voice radios.
Surface/Air Interoperability Laboratory (SAIL). The SAIL was a mock ship laboratory
with production representative U.S. Naval ship board sensors and data link avionics. The
SAIL employed radar (SPS-67(V)3 & SPS-64) and Identification Friend or Foe (UPX36/37) sensors for Link-11 and Link-16 data link tests. The SAIL provided a direct link
to E-2C aircraft on the ground and airborne. The SAIL also provided integrated analysis
tools and recording systems for Link-11 and Link-16 data link troubleshooting and
analysis.
MISSION SCENARIOS
E-2C Hawkeye Command and Control in Air Defense and War at Sea exercises were
planned to incorporate multiple assets. Air defense exercises entail detecting suspected
aircraft via the onboard detection sensors, and utilizing data links to vector fighter aircraft
in pursuit. War at Sea exercises utilizes the onboard sensors to suspect surface vessels
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and the E-2C aircrew ability to utilize the onboard avionics to develop an attack plan that
will minimize collateral damage and maximize target destruction. Strike aircraft, such as
F/A-18 were planned to execute the designed attacks utilizing data link information. In
both exercises, the over all tactical picture was to be reported to other data link platforms.
No actual ordinance was to be delivered.
SOFTWARE STABILITY
Overall software stability was evaluated throughout the test period. All noted instability,
false alarms, alerts and computer crashes were recorded for mean time between failure
(MTBF) calculations.
INSTRUMENTATION
Both A/C 294 and 601 used MCR Data Extraction (DX) to record system messages,
status and operator input. DX is a legacy mission computer function that was used
extensively for test and development in the Litton L-304. DX was designed to record
types of data selected by the operator when desired. For these flights, DX was collected
on all flights and used as the primary data source for troubleshooting efforts. A list of
selectable data points is listed in Appendix B. The DX files were created and placed on
the Personal Computer Memory Card International Association (PCMCIA) cards used to
load the OFP onto the MCR.
In addition, the A/C 294 instrumentation package also contained a Data Recording
System (DRS) Exabyte Recorder located between the Combat Information Center Officer
(CICO) and Radar Officer (RO) stations. The DRS recorded message and data input from
the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) and Navigation data busses.
The unit was configured with an EXABYTE 8900-tape drive capable of recording up to
40 GB of compressed reformatted data at a peak data rate of 10 Mbytes/second and a
sustained data rate of 6 Mbytes/second. DRS passively recorded data between the
sensors and mission computer on the 1553B data buses listed in table 3. A Scan
Converter recorded the Air Control Officer (ACO) EFPR display and audio commentary
during test.

TABLE 3: DRS RECORDING PARAMETERS
System
Radar
IFF
Antenna Azimuth
1553 DDBC

Data
MCR to Radar Detector Processor (DP) and DP to MCR messages
MCR to IFF Processor (IIP) and IIP to MCR messages
Digital data input
JTIDS and Navigation data buses
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DATA REDUCTION AND ANALYSIS
The E-2C System Test and Evaluation Laboratory (ESTEL) and SPAWAR SSA
performed data reduction, analysis, and mission reconstruction of recorded data.
Analysis was conducted using ESTEL-developed programs that provided tabular and
graphic representations of radar, IFF, navigation, and data link flight data. Anomalies
were analyzed by Northrop Grumman Corporation (NGC)-Dayton for corrective action,
which were retested when schedule allowed.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
GENERAL
MCR performance was evaluated over a six-month period, in two differently
configured aircraft, for a combined total of 111 flight hours and 301 ground and lab test
hours. The test team noted marked improvements over the Litton L-304 mission
computer and many discrepancies during the test period. The integration and reporting of
detection sensor information was satisfactory. There were no noted discrepancies with
the radar, IFF, or PDS. Over a 100 deficiencies were noted during the flight tests,
however, only a few of the deficiencies are discussed to highlight issues that may apply
to all types of developmental software tests in the aviation arena.
MISSION COMPUTER PROGRAM LOAD TIME
MCR program loading was quantitatively evaluated for response time during lab,
ground, and flight tests. To turn the legacy L-304 system on, power was applied at the
Processor Power Control Panel (PPCP), a “090 “code was dialed into the Computer
Control Panel (CCP) and the PROGRAM LOAD button was depressed. Upon activating
the PROGRAM LOAD button, the L-304 required approximately three minutes to
complete the program load. With the MCR, program loads were automatically loaded by
turning the power on at the PPCP. Similar to the legacy L-304, the MCR can also be
manually loaded by entering a “090” code into the lenticulars on the MCR control panel,
shown in figure 6, and depressing the PROGRAM LOAD button. Using the automatic
load from the Power On mode on the PPCP required approximately 80 sec to complete
load. Manually loading with the “090” lenticular codes required approximately 42 sec to
complete load. The MCR reduced the program load time by at least 56% resulting in a
significant improvement in operator use and mission readiness.

Enter 090
into the
lenticulars
for a
manual
load

Program
Load button

NTRP 3-22.2-E2C, May 2005
FIGURE 6: COMPUTER CONTROL PANEL
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As the program load time and overall processing time increased with the MCR, the
expeditiousness revealed some interesting discrepancies hidden by the legacy L-304
system. For example, in the E-2C Group II Non-Navigation upgrade, the mission
computer is the aircraft navigation data bus controller and it controls the flow of
navigation data for the entire aircraft. When the MCR is loaded and the weapon system
navigation solution initialization is depressed, the cockpit GPS readout initializes and
blanks out. While this occurred in the legacy L-304, the quick mission computer load
time emphasized the GPS readout blanking. The missing GPS readout during mission
computer loading was identified as a discrepancy that should be corrected as soon as
practicable.
INSTRUMENTATION PLAN
After numerous hours of ground tests and functionality checks, the GrIIM RePR
conducted its first test flight on February 20, 2004 with software version 1.5.0.AI.
During aircraft flight preparations, the MCR was turned on and all systems appeared to
be in an operating status. Once airborne, the test aircrew attempted to initiate Data
Extraction instrumentation to record the data flow in and out of the MCR. As soon as the
DX was started, the MCR indicated a Computer Processor Link Down (CP LINK
DOWN) status that terminated the MCR processors. The MCR was rebooted, and
successfully came back on line. The DX instrumentation was initiated once again, but
only produced the same results. After several minutes of leaving the MCR off, the
system was turned back on and DX appeared to work.
Without the DX data, determining the actual cause of the CP LINK DOWN status was
challenging. Several versions of software were created with various “fixes” targeted to
remedy the DX issue. All fixes were based on suspected causes discovered in the
manufacturer and Software Support Activity (SSA) attempts to reproduce the event in lab
tests. The actual cause to the CP LINK DOWN status is unknown because there was no
instrumentation data recorded during the events.
After approximately 18 hours of flight time with software version 1.6.2.AM on A/C
294, the GrIIM RePR IPT lead decided to go forth and install the MCR in an operational
fleet squadron E-2C Group II aircraft (A/C 601). A/C 601 conducted six test flights with
version 1.6.2.AM. During a test flight in A/C 601, the MCR reverted to a CP Link Down
status following initiation of DX and receiving an IFF Overflow (IFF OFL) alert on the
Auxiliary Display Unit. MCR power was recycled and DX was reinitiated. The MCR
reverted to a CP LINK DOWN status again. The MCR was shut down for approximately
10 minutes, reloaded, and then maintained a stable tactical load upon DX reinitiation.
On a separate flight in A/C 601, the MCR reverted to CP LINK DOWN status with
no apparent initiating action, and a Malfunction Sub-panel ERROR SLOT 5 fault light
illuminated with no history fault codes. MCR power was recycled, and the computer was
stable for the remainder of the flight.
The DX instrumentation was the subject of several previous software versions
tested during development in the manufacturer and SSA labs. While DX is not a function
fleet operators would utilize during normal operations, DX did function properly in the
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previous Litton L-304 mission computer. In the process, the DRS instrumented data did
not prove to hold much data that could be useful in troubleshooting the MCR issues. DX
became the primary instrumentation tool, yet was apparently causing issues in MCR
operations and test team efforts. Tailored DX collections had to be used to avoid
overloading the system and potentially causing another CP LINK DOWN status.
Approximately 11 other deficiencies appeared throughout the flight test period, whose
faults were attributed to DX operations. With limited amount of flights, the desire would
have been to fly with as many DX points selected for as long as we could. The more
statistical data available for analysis would provide more confidence in test results.
Final flight tests conducted with software version 1.7.5 (AQ/AR) did not demonstrate
CP LINK DOWN status with DX use. However, tests with this software version were
limited to 26 flight hours. Whether the true cause has been completely isolated has not
been determined.
HOOKING TRACKS
During ground tests, aircrew had difficulty “hooking a track.” Hooking tracks, shown
in figure 7, are the means by which an operator can select a track to reveal all of its
parametric data such as type of platform, course, speed, and data link track number.
During the ground test, it was noted as a one-time anomaly. However, during flight test,
the inability to hook a track appeared again. DX data was being collected, whose
analysis showed that there were no anomalies. However, DX was still faulted as the
culprit. No immediate software changes or fixes were created, because the exact problem
could not be identified

.

FIGURE 7: AIRCREW HOOKING TRACKS
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The Software Support Activity (SSA) attempted to reproduce this deficiency with
their limited bench set up in their lab. Their set up included the MCR and only one of
three working stations. The SSA was not able to reproduce the deficiency.
After flight tests with the MCR on the operational fleet aircraft (A/C 601) were
completed, the aircraft continued to fly operational squadron exercises. During one of
their flights on June 13, 2005, the inability to hook a track appeared again while DX was
not being taken. After four months, DX was finally ruled out as the culprit for this and
many deficiencies. Some deficiencies originally categorized as affected by DX were not
retargeted for correction and regression flight tests due to schedule limitations.
CANCELLED MISSION SCENARIOS
Due to the track hooking deficiency, developmental testing came to a stop until it was
resolved. By the time the actual cause was identified by the NGC software coders, the
planned mission scenario flights were cancelled in an effort to test all the individual
segments and meet the program’s schedule.
DATA LINK - LINK 4A
In an effort to accelerate the test period due to program pressure to meet initial
production schedules, Link 4A ground tests were bypassed and flight tests were
conducted. Software Support Activity (SSA) IV&V and manufacturer qualification lab
tests indicated there was low risk to performance in bypassing the ground tests.
TRACK IDENTITY
During the Link 4A test flight, A/C 294 was loaded with S/W version 1.6.2.AM and a
flight of two F/A-18C Hornets were loaded with OFP 17C. Track identification was
evaluated for accuracy. The E-2C created a track, gave it a HOSTILE ID and reported it
to the F/A-18s via the data link. One of the F/A-18s received the track and noted it as a
FRIEND, but the other F/A-18 received nothing. An Air-to-Air data link pointer on the
suspect track was then transmitted to the flight of two Hornets. The F/A-18 that
originally received the track as a FRIEND, then properly displayed the track as a
HOSTILE. The other F/A-18 never saw the track. Data extraction (DX) analysis reveals
A/C 294 was only reporting tracks with HOSTILE ID at the time in question. There was
no instrumented data from the F/A-18. This anomaly warranted further ground and lab
tests.
SSA IV&V personnel reviewed their canned Link 4A test procedures and repeated the
steps and set up the aircrew experienced with the incorrect track ID. SSA could not
repeat the same results, nor find any problems with the recorded E-2C flight data.
Ensuing ground tests were conducted with A/C 294 loaded with S/W version
1.6.2.AM and a single F/A-18C Hornet with OFP 19C parked next to the E-2C Hawkeye.
The same track ID accuracy tests were conducted. Additional instrumentation was
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utilized in the E-2C and F/A-18C. When a Link 4A network was established, fighter
aircraft received their controlling unit’s FRIEND track on their display as designed.
When the F/A-18 receives transmitted tracks from the E-2C, all tracks are available on
the same display. Ground tests provided results similar to the flight test. E-2C data
extraction revealed the message formats arranged by the MCR software were in proper
form and content. The F/A-18 data extraction, shown in figure 8, indicates an unstable
position for individual tracks over time. The F/A-18 DX demonstrated the “bopping” of
tracks that were recorded by over-the-shoulder display recordings. Closer review of the
F/A-18 display depicted the transmitted track quickly switching between the E-2C
FRIEND and HOSTILE identification (ID), with the FRIEND ID being dominant.
There was lengthy discussion about the aging Link 4A system being replaced with
Link 16 air control, and the indefinite certainty where the source of the problem was.
The E-2C DX presented MCR reports of what it was transmitting. The F/A-18 displayed
what its mission computer “received.” There was no test or instrumentation readily
available to determine what messages and information was actually transmitted through
each aircraft’s antennae. The IPT decided that the Link 4A system attracts a strikefighter’s attention to the tracks of interest, regardless of their correct ID. The test team
agreed that in the interest of testing other aspects of the MCR, the discrepancy could be
avoided by tactically training aircrew to effectively use the data link by avoiding the use
of specific IDs.
GHOST TRACKS
During the Link 4A flight tests, E-2C operators noticed numerous sporadic tracks
reported from an unknown Link 4A aircraft. There were only three aircraft in the
network: one E-2C and two F/A-18. Each data link track reported to the E-2C from the
F/A-18 is designed to display each aircraft’s Data Link Address (DLA). The DLA from
the sporadic tracks was “00000” which correlated to neither F/A-18. Data extraction did
not have any information on these tracks, nor did this discrepancy happen again.
UNSOLICITED LINK 4A WILCO RESPONSES
During ground tests, Statements were directed to the F/A-18C. Statements are similar
to Link 11 and Link 16 Force Orders. Statements give direction to the recipient to
execute specific commands such as ENGAGE, CEASE FIRE, and ORBIT to name a few.
When a Statement is received, F/A-18 aircrew will typically actuate a button to transmit a
Will Comply (WILCO) message to the Statement initiator. This provides the Command
and Control platform assurance the Statement was received. The E-2C sent several
mission statements to the F/A-18C/D to verify all the mission statements were working.
Link 4A WILCO replies were generated and received by the E-2C while the response
was neither available nor selected by the F/A-18C/D operator. The unsolicited Link 4A
WILCO responses falsely implied the fighter aircraft were accepting Link 4A assigned
missions.
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FIGURE 8: F/A-18 LINK 4A “SINGLE” TRACK DATA RECEIVED AND DISPLAYED
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MISSION COMPUTER TIME
Mission computer resets were conducted to verify the appropriate tracks and
databases cleared. MCR resets included actuating the CP CLEAR button and STATUS
RESET buttons both located at the operator’s station. When the buttons were actuated,
the resets took approximately 10 seconds before the system was running again. Testers
noticed that when the system came back on line, the mission clock resumed at the exact
time the resets were actuated. The discrepancy was immediately brought to the IPT
attention and the Software Support Activity (SSA) repeated it at their lab. Six weeks and
six software versions later, the time required for resets were decreased to 4-6 seconds.
Further analysis revealed that the mission clock was not a true clock. The displayed
clock was actually a software timer. More over, the software timer was what was in the
L-304 as well, but the resets recovered much quicker to notice the delay in time. This
issue was resolved by speeding up the time required to conduct the resets. The “clock” is
still not a true clock. Aircrew are being advised to conduct time synchronizations with
the assets under their control and to utilize GPS time synchronizations to keep a more
accurate timeline.
SOFTWARE RELEASES
Throughout the test period, the realization began to set that software testing was not
like classical testing, in terms of schedule. Traditional testing entails taking a prototype
and evaluating it against a specification or requirement. The prototype or test article
either meets or fails it. With software, there is continual effort to modify and “fix” a
problem because the repairs are relatively quicker. Typically, software lines of code
(SLOC) are added, deleted or modified. While the legacy software contained
approximately 256,000 SLOC, the RePLACE hosting software required approximately
36,000 SLOC (Haldeman, 2005).
Over six months, 12 updated versions of Emulator Input/Output Software (EIOS)
were released for test, listed in table 4. As discrepancies were discovered and identified
as serious and/or relative simple fixes, the software was upgraded and released. When
airworthiness flight clearances were approved, the various software versions were tested
in flight. Some EIOS versions were released so soon, the flight clearances were not even
signed when the next version was released. Of concern, the frequency of software
release, as depicted in figure 9, did not allow for much regression testing. A detailed
description of each software version and its associated remedies can be found in table A3.
MEAN TIME BETWEEN FAILURES
MCR reliability was observed during 412 hours of lab, ground and flight tests with
aircraft 294 and 601. MCR reliability was required to have a Mean Time Between
Failure (MTBF) of at least 10,000 operating hours. CCP hardware failures that occurred
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TABLE 4: E-2C MISSION COMPUTER REPLACEMENT FLIGHT TEST TIME
Software
Version

Released
Date

Flt Hours
Under Test

1.5.0.AI

5-Feb

12.8

1.6.0.AK

18-Feb

NONE

1.6.0.AL

3-Mar

NONE

1.6.1.AM

4-Mar

NONE

1.6.2.AM

8-Mar

72.0

1.6.3.AM

11-Mar

NONE

1.7.0.AN

22-Mar

NONE

1.7.1.AO

31-Mar

NONE

1.7.2.AO

8-Apr

NONE

1.7.3.AP

27-May

NONE

1.7.4.AQ

1-Jun

NONE

1.7.5.AQ

2-Jun

7.0

1.7.5.AR

18-Jun

19.0

Frequency of Updated MCR Software Versions during Flight Test
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Nth version of Software

12

10

8

6

4

2

0
Feb-04

Mar-04

Apr-04

May-04

Jun-04

Date of Release
FIGURE 9: EIOS SOFTWARE RELEASE FREQUENCY DURING THE FLIGHT TEST PERIOD
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early in lab test with EIOS S/W version 1.5.0.AI were considered to be design defects.
The Chi-Squared statistical distribution was used to calculate the expected values for
hardware and software reliability based on 301 lab and ground and 111 flight test hours
(Lapin, 1978). With 412 hrs of test available for calculating MTBF, the best case
scenario could only be estimated to 8000 hours, shown in table 5. Considering three
separate flights where the MCR became inoperable with a “CP LINK DOWN” the
expected MTBF was calculated to be between 53 and 302 hours.
Additional consideration should be given to general software reliability. Given a
classical test article, one can assume the standard bathtub graph for failure rate, shown in
figure 10 (Rosenberg, 1998). For software, the current assumption is that software
cannot be made without bugs (Inacio, 1998). Let the problematic software bugs be
considered as system failures, and the initial failure rate is high. The software failure rate
eventually approaches a minimum, shown in figure 10.
In developmental test and integration, the failure rate of software is more like figure
11, where each new upgrade release starts with a higher initial failure rate. The legacy
OFP had already been tested for the E-2C Group II. Consider the legacy OFP as the
initial software release and the RePLACE software as an upgrade. Because of the
increasing complexity of combined software, one can expect the eventual failure rate to
increase (Pan, 1999).
MCR OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE
In summary, the MCR performance with the radar, IFF, PDS and navigation systems
was satisfactory for the AEW mission. Rather than rebuild a new software architecture
that re-hosts legacy LISA software proved to be a wise decision. Over 100 discrepancies

TABLE 5: MTBF PREDICTION (90% CONFIDENCE) OF MCR BASED ON 412 OPERATING TEST
HOURS

Number of
Failures

Chi-Squared Predicted
MTBF Lower Limit

Chi-Squared Predicted MTBF
Upper Limit

None

137.5

8000

1

86.80

1158

2

65.40

505.5

3

53.20

301.8

4

45.00

209.1

5

39.20

157.6
(Two-Sided Chi-Squared Distribution)
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(Rosenberg, Hammer, and Shaw, 1998)
FIGURE 10: STANDARD FAILURE RATES

(Pan, 1999)
FIGURE 11: SOFTWARE FAILURE RATE WITH SOFTWARE UPGRADES
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structure with current software, Northrop Grumman’s RePLACE software technology
were noted during the six-month test phase with12 software releases. By the time the
final software version was released, the remaining discrepancies had targeted corrections.
The GrIIM RePR eventually succeeded in providing the operational fleet with a
Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS), Open Architecture system that has proven the
validity of Northrop Grumman’s RePLACE technology.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
KEYS TO SUCCESS
Current military operational aircraft and avionics systems are aging--if they are not
already antiquated. Today’s technological age has provided software engineering and
software driven products to maintain and upgrade our military force. Northrop
Grumman’s Reconfigurable Processor for Legacy Applications Codes Execution
(RePLACE) technology has been proven to be a smart choice in transforming and
upgrading old aircraft and their avionics systems to operate in the current technological
battle space.
As the E-2C Hawkeye Group II Mission Computer Replacement Program (GrIIM
RePr) Integrated Product Team adopted a “one team approach,” they were able to
successfully deliver an improved mission computer to the fleet in a timely manner.
While many of their accolades are well deserved, there are items that could have been
done better. There’s always room for improvement.
As in all test programs, thorough consideration needs to be dedicated to test
instrumentation equipment and data collection. In addition, having the right team
members and a realistic schedule will keep the test team focused. When dealing with
software development and testing, the rapid release of software and configuration
management can be a hindrance if not handled correctly. These items, discussed below,
were evident in the GrIIM RePR test efforts.
INSTRUMENTATION AND DATA COLLECTION
Instrumentation and data are the fuel for producing test results. They are critical for
thorough analysis. Without the data, or the instrumentation to collect it, tests will have to
be repeated. Unplanned repeated tests impact a test team’s budget and schedule.
The Mission Computer Replacement’s (MCR) main source of data collection was the
data extraction (DX) function of the MCR. From the initial test flight, the team
experienced system crashes and were not able to determine the source because the
instrumentation was part of the system under test! That lapse in planning cost the test
team unplanned regression efforts with solutions the team merely hoped would work.
After 12 versions of software, many of which modified DX capability, a version of
software or a combination of the modifications appeared to have fixed it.
Moreover, because the DX was part of the system under test, it falsely took the blame
for many discovered deficiencies. The program lost months of test time when the
inability to hook tracks was blamed on the data collection. Ironically, it was not during a
test flight when DX was ruled out as the source of the inability to hook tracks.
When dealing with a system that utilizes data links, or some form of data sharing,
instrumentation and data collection needs to expand to the other assets as well. The MCR
test team’s Link 4A flight is a prime example of expanding the scope. If instrumented
data was collected from the F/A-18 Hornet during the Link 4A flight, the subsequent
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ground tests would not have been required. Lacking the data, the ground tests and
additional instrumentation was utilized which continued to drain flight test funds.
Fortunately, there were no Link 11 or Link 16 deficiencies that required external asset
instrumented data. Had there been performance issues, those test flights would have been
repeated as well.
The appropriate instrumentation equipment to use varies with what item is being
tested. For mission computer testing, external instrumentation such as the Data
Recording System for the E-2C Hawkeye should be revised and utilized. The
instrumentation should not be part of the test article! When conducting data link tests,
consideration should be given to collecting instrumented data from all other platforms the
aircraft networks with.
AVOID CHRONIC SOFTWARE RELEASES
The flexibility software engineering provides makes it enticing to quickly correct
identified problems. Each software fix creates a new software version that will require
regression tests to truly verify targeted bug(s) are fixed and that no new ones have been
created that may affect parts of the system already tested. As each new release comes
out, the tests essentially start over. With the MCR, four of the twelve software versions
were tested. The last software version was tested for only 19 hours. Nineteen hours does
not provide enough time for regression testing or legitimate Mean Time Between Failure
measurements.
Combining all of the MCR ground, lab, and flight test hours for all of the software
versions tested does not provide enough time to assess a MTBF of more than 8,000
hours. If the individual software versions were broken down and assessed, the calculated
MTBF would be remarkably less. Neither of which would have allowed the team to
determine if the system would have met the 10,000 hour MTBF requirement.
Multiple software releases repeats the circle chase back to the beginning of test
efforts and it never ends. Should there be room in the schedule, every effort should be
made to re-baseline software, but be aware that testing is potentially endless. It is simply
impossible to test until all the bugs are discovered and removed (Pan, 1999).
As software products continue to enter critical military operations, consideration
should be given to incorporating a software maturity model. Software organizations have
Capability Maturity Models that describe their ability to provide reliable software. With
new technology, the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration utilize a similar maturity models called Technology Readiness Levels
(DODI 5000.2, 2004). Each level has criteria that need to be met before they can elevate
to the next level. A similar model should be used for software releases. In line with the
Depart of Defense Technology Readiness Levels, the author recommends the following
Levels:
Level 1– Basic software concepts are discussed and documented.
Level 2– Documentation on how the software will interact or perform should be
provided.
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Level 3– Software components successfully performs in the manufacturer’s lab
environment.
Level 4– Complete software successfully performs in the manufacturer’s lab
environment.
Level 5– Software successfully performs in the Independent Validation & Verification
(IV&V) lab environment.
Level 6– Software successfully performs in the Developmental Test environment.
Level 7– Software successfully performs in the Operational Test environment.
Level 8– successfully performs in operational environment.
Level 9– Software successfully performs in operational environment during actual
missions.
The software package should not be introduced to flight test until it has successfully
achieved level 5. MCR software initially followed a similar model. However, as the
schedule began to diminish, software versions were going from Level 3 to level 6. To
recoup lost time, software versions were simultaneously run through IV&V and flight
test. Strict adherence to such a model will help make configuration management and
tests run smooth.
CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT (CM)
CM with the software under test is just as important as the software external test assets
utilize. The Link 4A flight and ground tests utilized different F/A-18 OFP versions.
Efforts to troubleshoot deficiencies noted from the flight test where the F/A-18 utilized
OFP version17C were never resolved during the MCR test phase. Subsequent ground
tests with F/A-18 OFP version 19C technically only discovered separate deficiencies
from that of OFP 17C. The track ID deficiency was never truly resolved. Due to
schedule pressures, further testing was not allowed. Link 4A tactical use had to be
modified and operators need to be trained on the ramifications of using track IDs. It is in
the author’s opinion, that this is an unsatisfactory result due to poor CM. In this
particular case, the poor CM not only impacted efforts to fix the problem, it transferred
the problem into the hands of the actual user.
CM will continue to be a high risk item with the potential to devastate software
testing. It should not be feared, but embraced and managed closely and accurately.
RESIDENT EXPERTS
Ensure the appropriate personnel are involved through the duration of developmental
test. The GrIIM RePR was fortunate to have the Software Support Activity (SSA)
IV&V personnel available throughout lab and flight tests. Their resident knowledge in
the legacy software was immeasurable as they assisted in troubleshooting efforts.
Because the SSA was in the business of producing the legacy Operation Flight Program
software, they had a test bench set up to reproduce reported deficiencies, such as the
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mission computer clock and the delays accrued during resets. The IV&V personnel did
catch many deficiencies that were fixed before most of the software was placed in flight
test. However, their test bench did have some limitations.
When bench testing is conducted, the simulation should be as real as possible. The
“Hooking Track” deficiency was not reproduced in the SSA, as they attempted to recreate
the test scenario with only one of three operator displays. It is not conclusive that the
inability to reproduce the deficiency at the SSA was due to missing work stations, but the
author believes it would have been more likely to do so with a full aircraft representative
complement. Until the Hooking Track deficiency ruled out DX, the SSA succumbed to
the theory that the DX capability was the culprit.
The SSA had simulation and stimulation isolated to the E-2C. There was no way they
could verify the Link 4A functionality without F/A-18 simulation and stimulation
equipment. Bear in mind that simulation and stimulation can only test so much. Actual
flight tests, on the actual platform, and in the appropriate environment are the only true
validation and verification.
In addition to the IV&V software experts, the test team was able to save time and
money by conducting combined Developmental and Operational tests. The combined
DT/OT worked well in the MCR test efforts because the flight profiles were the same.
Along with the DT/OT testers, the manufacturer software code writers and testers were
also at hand to quickly debrief and discuss test results. The IV&V, combined DT/OT and
manufacturer tester team membership throughout the flight test phase ultimately made
the program successful.
PLAN A REALISTIC SCHEDULE WITH EXPECTED LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE
The flexibility of software programming can be easily misunderstood. “Quick” fixes
does not necessarily mean positive results sooner than before. With the anticipated
software bugs and regression testing, do not “Plan for Success.” Programs that expect
everything to work the first time are likely to have difficulty trying to meet their original
schedule. Do not forget that time is required to analyze the collected data.
With every program, there are trade offs between cost, schedule and performance.
With the limited schedule, the overall performance is placed at risk. For example, the
Mean Time Between Failure specifications could not be validated unless the appropriate
number of hours are utilized for test and operation. The GrIIM RePr was supposed to
validate a 10,000 hour MTBF, but the team only tested enough hours that could attest for
8,000 hours. Infant mortality is a gray area when it comes to software development,
especially when software bugs are expected with new releases. Schedules need to
anticipate the requirements to fix the expected problems.
SUMMARY
Software can bring resounding success in the test world, and at the same time can
bring misery. Proper planning in terms of configuration management, data collection,
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and personnel will make software testing less painful than it has to be. Poor
configuration management is easy to do if the test team is not careful. It can be the test
team’s worst enemy as it can impact cost, schedule and performance. Given a schedule
that accounts for realistic contingencies associated with software testing, and the
appropriate personnel to conduct, analyze and fix the software will make software
development testing smooth sailing.
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APPENDIX A: MCR DESCRIPTION
MCR HARDWARE DESCRIPTION
GENERAL
The Mission Computer Replacement, also known as Tactical Computer Group (OL698/ASQ), is designed to replace the Group II legacy L-304 Computer Programmer (OL424/AQ). The MCR consists of two cabinets: the Computer Terminal Control cabinet,
and the Digital Computer cabinet, shown in figure A-1. The MCR hardware is presented
in tables A-1 and A-2.

NTRP 3-22.2-E2C, May 2005
FIGURE A-1: MCR HARDWARE LOCATION
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TABLE A-1: MCR HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE
Name
Vx Works Real-Time Operating System
RePLACE(1) L-304/DDBC(2) and EHSP(3) ,
LVM(4) Emulators
EIOS

(5)

Computer Control Panel (CCP)
Removable Mass Storage
System (RMSS)

Nomenclature
---

Version
5.4
2.0.2

1C003RT001100

2.3.2

1C003RT001100

1.5.0.AI
1.6.2.AM
1.7.5.AQ
1.7.5.AR

WRA / LRA #

PN: 243A120-1

WRA 46A1A1

PN: 243A087-1

WRA 46A1A2

Processor Module (SBC)

PN: 238A505-900

Serial/Display Module (SDM)

PN: 260A150-1

Power Supply Module (PSM)

PN: 243A110-1

Transient Holdup Module (THM)

PN: 253A254-1

LRA6
46A2A3A1A5
LRA
46A2A3A1A1
LRA
46A2A3A1A8
LRA
46A2A3A1A7

Versatile Module Europa (VME) Back Panel
(VBP)
EMI Filter Assembly (EFA)
Relay Assembly (REA)
Computer Terminal Control
C-12689/A

PN: 243A090-1

WRA7 46A2A3A1

PN: 243A119-1
PN: 253A289-1

WRA 46A2A1
WRA 46A2A2

PN: 243A100-3

WRA 46A1

Digital Computer

CD-2561/A
PN:
1C003AD110000

WRA 46A2

VME Card Cage Assembly (VCA)

PN: 243A101-2

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

RePLACE (Reconfigurable Processor for Legacy Applications Code Execution)
Digital Data Bus Controller
Enhanced High Speed Processor
Legacy Virtual Machine
Emulator Input/Output Software
Line Replacement Assembly
Weapons Replacement Assembly
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TABLE A-2: MCR WRA, SRA, AND COMPONENTS

NOMENCLATURE
Computer Terminal Control Cabinet
Digital Computer Cabinet
Isolator Trays
Front Access Panel
Computer Control Panel
Removable Mass Storage System
Power Supply Module
Transient Holdup Module
EMI Filter
Relay Assembly
Custom Backpanel – VME64
Processor Module (SBC)
Serial / Display Module
Versatile Module Europa Card Cage
Shock Mounts (Isolators)
Internal Wiring Harnesses (16 ea.)
Grounding System (6 ea.)

PART NUMBER
1C003AD120000/243A100-3
1C003AD110000/243A100-2
261A853-1 (2 ea.)
261A841-1
243A120-1
243A087-1
243A110-1
253A254-1
243A119-1
253A289-1
243A090-1
1C003BA110110/253A290-2
260A150-1
243A101-2
HT2-50 (12 ea.)

COMPUTER TERMINAL CONTROL CABINET
The Computer Terminal Control cabinet consists of the base cabinet, six shock
mounts, top isolator bar, three grounding straps, front access panel, the Computer Control
Panel (CCP) and the Removable Mass Storage System (RMSS), and appropriate wiring
harnesses.
DIGITAL COMPUTER CABINET
The Digital Computer cabinet consists of the base cabinet, six shock mounts, top
isolator bar, three grounding straps, front access panel, Processor Module with the
Reconfigurable Processor for Legacy Applications Code Execution (RePLACE) L-304
and EHSP Emulators, Serial/Display Module, Transient Holdup Module, Power Supply
Module, Relay Assembly, EMI Filter, the VME chassis and back panel, appropriate
wiring harnesses, six shock mounts, top isolator bar, and three grounding straps.
COMPUTER CONTROL PANEL (CCP)
The CCP located in the top bay of the Computer Terminal Control Cabinet provides
monitor and control of the MCR, including the processor and removable mass storage
unit functions. Specifically, the CCP includes integrated LED lighting and switch panel
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sampled every 100 milliseconds, RS-232c processor interface at 19.6 KBPS, and legacy
X, Y and Switch Data registers. The CCP is repairable only at the depot level with a
predicted MTBF of 128,000 hours. The CCP has two modes, normal (OFP) and RMSS
mode (PCMCIA Card cloning and zeroizing). The controls and indicators on the panel
are functionally divided into five parts:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

Operator Input and Control
System Control
Removable Mass Storage System (RMSS) Status and Control
Processor Status and Control
Malfunction Subpanel

REMOVABLE MASS STORAGE SYSTEM
The Removable Mass Storage System (RMSS) located in the CCP provides for the
storage and retrieval of operational programs (Tactical Flight Program, Fault Isolation
Program), mission data (Geo Points, Intelligence Files), and maintenance data (DX, Data
Save). It can use either one or two 128 MB or greater PCMCIA Cards. The RMSS
interfaces to the Processor Module through the CCP via a SCSI-2 bus. The RMSS reads
and writes to flash at a 4 MB/sec burst rate. The RMSS is not repairable with an MTBF
of 200,000 hours.
POWER SUPPLY MODULE
The Power Supply Module converts MIL-STD-704A aircraft 400 Hz power, after
passing through the EMI Filter and Relay Assembly, to DC power needed by the MCR
modules including the CCP/RMSS assembly. The aircraft supplied 28VDC is simply
passed through without conditioning or conversion. The Power Supply is only repairable
at the OEM-Level with an MTBF of 85,000 hours.
TRANSIENT HOLDUP MODULE
The Transient Holdup Module uses a set of capacitors to provide stored power
adequate for the Power Supply to maintain power to all components of the MCR except
28 Volts. The PSM maintains the THM charge levels at 240 Volts until there is a loss of
aircraft power, at which time, the THM supplies sufficient power back to the PSM to
maintain full operational capability for at least 300 milliseconds. For safety reasons, the
THM is designed to rapidly discharge upon power-down in 15 seconds. The Transient
Holdup Module is only repairable at the OEM-Level with an MTBF of 1,666,000 hours.
EMI FILTER
The purpose of the EMI Filter is to filter the aircraft input power to prevent/reduce the
EMI environment of the aircraft from adversely affecting the MCR electronics. It filters
38

1.25 amperes of three phase 400 Hz power as well as 2 amperes 28VDC. The EMI Filter
is only repairable at the OEM-Level with a predicted MTBF of 3,058,000 hours.
RELAY ASSEMBLY
The purpose of the Relay Assembly is to disconnect 3-phase 400 Hz power to the
Power Supply in the case of a thermal over temperature detected by sensors on the Power
Supply Module. The Relay Assembly is only repairable at the OEM-Level with a
predicted MTBF of 1,119,000 hours.
VME BACKPANEL
The VME backpanel is an enhanced standard VME backplane. All communications
between the components of the MCR are through the VME backplane. It has 9 slots for
VME Cards (of which only 4 are currently in use) as well as a number of connectors for
I/O and power. The Backplane physically is a multilayered Printed Circuit Board (PCB).
Keying for modules and cables that avoid inadvertent damage was incorporated. The
VME backplane is only repairable at the OEM Level with a predicted MTBF of 266,000
hours.
PROCESSOR MODULE
The Processor Module, based on the LMSI 450 MHz SP-103B Product line, has two
PowerPC CPUs (7410) with several types of memory and I/O channels. CPU1 hosts the
L-304 Operational Programs (formerly both L-304 CPU A and CPU B) and the Digital
Data Bus Controller (DDBC). CPU2 hosts the EHSP Operational Program.
Communications between the various operational programs is through the common
processor memories, replicating the precise legacy memory architecture and their
interactions. MIL-STD-1553B data bus communications for the JTIDS Bus and the
Navigations Bus, RS-232 and SCSI communications with the CCP/RMSS, and several
discretes are also provided by the Single Board Computer (SBC). All other aircraft
communication is provided via VME control. The SBC performs Power-On Built-In Test
(BIT). It also performs continual operational check. The SBC Processor Module is only
repairable at the OEM-Level with a predicted MTBF of 41,000 hours.
SERIAL/DISPLAY MODULE
The Serial/Display Module (SDM) replaced the legacy L-304 Data Converters (Nav,
PM, Display, Radar/IFF, PDS, Control, and COMM). The SBC Processor Module
controls the SDM through dedicated I/O memory locations and various registers (control,
status, discrete, and synchro registers). The Serial/Display Module is only repairable at
the OEM-Level with a predicted MTBF of 97,000 hours. The SDM has the following
interface capabilities:
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a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
h)
i)

EMDU Parallel Data Interfaces (3)
1.2 MB Serial Interfaces (11)
Link 11
Link 4A with ASW-25
Discrete I/O (48)
CCP discretes (2)
0-15 VDC Analog Output
Synchro Outputs
32K x 32 SRAM

GROUNDING
The grounding concept for the MCR consists of three (3) grounding planes embedded
in the Backpanel, and each module is grounded. The coax cables are connected to the
Chassis Ground Plane while the power is connected to the 28 VDC and Chassis Ground
Planes as appropriate to the power voltage. The cabinet itself is grounded via 3 grounding
straps attached to the bottom of the cabinet.
VME CHASSIS
The VME chassis is a 6U (1U is equal to 1.75 inches) VME card cage (oriented in the
vertical position), which is securely fastened in the Digital Computer cabinet and holds
the Custom VME Backplane Assembly (BPA) and the SBC, THM, PSM, and SDM
Module.
MCR SOFTWARE
GENERAL
Reconfigurable Processor for Legacy Applications Code Execution (RePLACE),
developed by Northrop Grumman, is a generic, software-based technology that can run
older, legacy software on newer, state-of-the-art COTS microprocessors.
With RePLACE, the legacy software binary load module runs unmodified without the
need for rewriting or recompiling, assuring a backward compatibility with the existing
system -- with no inadvertent loss of the undocumented capabilities of the embedded
code. The legacy software can execute much faster providing dramatic performance
improvements without modifying a single line of legacy code.
RePLACE provides the framework and tools to incrementally expand or replace
existing legacy functions with new, object oriented code, operating concurrently with the
remaining legacy code functions. RePLACE establishes the foundation for hardware
upgrades working with trusted legacy software, creating a solid base on which additional
software capabilities can be incrementally added.
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RePLACE DISC
RePLACE is a software environment which executes on a state-of-the-art COTS
microprocessor. It is layered on top of a COTS real-time operating system and provides a
"virtual" legacy machine environment, capable of executing the legacy binary code of the
embedded computer being upgraded. It is composed of three primary components: the
legacy instruction set engine, the input/output (I/O) mapping software, and the virtual
component environment.
The instruction set engine is a compact set of highly optimized, native machine code
that fetches, decodes, and executes the legacy instructions on the fly. It uses a unique,
patented technique that keeps the execution of the instruction set engine and the legacy
code being run in the on-chip cache of the COTS microprocessor the majority of the time.
This is the major contributor to the significant performance gains in the legacy instruction
throughput. The instruction set engine can be easily retargeted to different (and even
unique) legacy instruction sets.
The I/O mapping software matches the data and control structures, as well as the
interfaces of the new replacement I/O devices, to those that the legacy binary code is
expecting to "see". This is a key component in providing the "virtual" legacy machine
environment. It typically is tailored for each legacy box type targeted.
The virtual component environment provides the mechanisms to switch between old,
legacy and new, native code environments, and to share data between them. It also
provides embedded real-time, non-intrusive monitoring and legacy code debugging
services. This environment communicates externally through a standard Ethernet port to a
low-cost, MS-Windows-based support tool environment.
The Reconfigurable Processor for Legacy Applications Code Execution (RePLACE)
software technology, with commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products is being used to
replace the E-2C legacy Mission Computer processors and electrical interfaces within the
E-2C Airborne Tactical Data System (ATDS). RePLACE technology provides a software
emulation of the existing Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) executing on a COTS
PowerPC processor. Companion emulator input/output software (EIOS) supports the
various system interfaces. The processors of the ATDS are the Litton L-304, the L3304
(DDBC), and the Enhanced High Speed Processor (EHSP). Using the RePLACE
software technology, portions of the Fault Isolation Program (FIP) are utilized in
detecting faults while faults with the new hardware are detected using built-in tests. The
FIP program of the legacy system is used to detect faults in the L-304 processor and
memory as well as subsystems, which include the six converters, Signal Command
Readout and Alarm Monitor (SCRAM), clocks/timers, CCP, consoles, navigation
equipment, and radios. A subset of the FIP program will continue to be used to detect
faults in the equipment not replaced in the GrIIM RePr system.
EMULATOR INPUT OUTPUT SOFTWARE
The E-2C Group II Mission Computer Replacement Program (GrIIM RePr) Emulator
Input/Output Software (EIOS) Computer Software Configuration Item (referred to as the
EIOS CSCI) provides for the emulation of the Input/Output (I/O) functions and
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(NAWCAD GrIIM RePR Test Plan, 2004)
FIGURE A-2: EIOS CSCI EXTERNAL INTERFACE LOGICAL DIAGRAM

interfaces. The interfaces are provided by unique hardware in the legacy line Replaceable
Unit (LRU) but are not available from Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) interfaces
used to implement the GrIIM RePr external signal interfaces. The EIOS CSCI external
interfaces are illustrated in figure A-2. The EIOS CSCI C++ executable files are suitable
for running on the SP-103B processor.
The EIOS CSCI provides input and output processing for the GrIIM RePr MIL-STD1553B bus data, the Serial/Display Module (SDM), the RS-232, and the Small Computer
System Interface (SCSI). The MIL-STD-1553B processing is handled by the SBC
onboard ACE 1553 Controller chip. All MIL-STD-1553B channels operate in either Bus
Control mode or Remote Terminal mode. All of the EIOS CSCI is hosted on the SP-103B
DISC Processor. The EIOS CSCI consists of a group of classes associated with the L-304
legacy processor and a group of classes associated with the Digital Data Bus Controller
(DDBC) legacy processor (the legacy DDBC is implemented with the L-3304 processor).
The EIOS CSCI has the following external interfaces:

42

a) VxWorks Real-Time Operating System (RTOS): The EIOS CSCI executes under
the control of the VxWorks RTOS. The EIOS CSCI interfaces to the RTOS via
VxWorks library calls, as defined in the VxWorks Programmers Guide.
VxWorks from WindRiver® Systems is the operating system that runs in the
target microprocessor board.
b) Reconfigurable Processor for Legacy Applications Code Execution (RePLACE)
L304/L3304 DISC: The EIOS CSCI communicates with the RePLACE
L304/L3304 DISC software via function calls as described in the IO Device
Writers Guide and Emulator Application Programming Interface (API).
c) MIL-STD-1553B ACE Controller: The IOC_B Chip onboard the SP103B board
handles the MIL-STD-1553B communication via the ACE Controller Interface.
d) Serial/Display Module (SDM): The EIOS CSCI communicates with the SDM via
Versatile Module Europa (VME) bus data transfers.
e) Timers Hardware: The EIOS CSCI communicates directly with the Timers’
Hardware on the host processor.
f) Small Computer System Interface (SCSI): The EIOS CSCI communicates directly
with the SCSI for the Removable Media Storage System (RMSS)
g) RS-232: The EIOS CSCI communicates with the Computer Control Panel (CCP)
directly across the RS-232 serial interface.
h) RS-232: The EIOS CSCI communicates with the Computer Control Panel (CCP)
directly across the RS-232 serial interface
SOFTWARE VERSION DESCRIPTION
Table A-3 contains a list of changes to the Emulator Input Output Software.
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TABLE A-3: SUMMARY OF EIOS CHANGES
MCR
VERSION
1.1

DATE
9/18/03

1.2

10/06/03

1.3

10/16/03

1.3.1

10/23/03

1.3.2
1.4

10/30/03
11/05/03

1.4.1

11/13/03

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES
1. tNetTask - VxWorks patch file
2. EMDU Freeze
3. TR-GN9-0006 - CP Status Reset
4. Link-11 Transmit - Changed size of transmit buffer.
5. RT-EHSP & RT-L304 - Changes to support data collection for
VIEW station.
PTR 153: Link-11 Transmit Not Working at Pax
PTR 154/TR-GN9-0005: JTIDS File Write Malfunction
PTR 157: Link-11 Net Control Mode not Correct
PTR 158: Incorrectly Executing Link-11 Transmit Complete on Test
PTR 160: Remove VCEL304 include paths and libraries from ROM
builds
PTR 161: Multiplex L304 and DDBC Timer
PTR 162: Eliminate Timer Drift
PTR 163: DDBC Priority in Task Manager
PTR 164: Add Instrumentation to L304
PTR 154/TR-GN9-0005: JTIDS File Write Malfunction
PTR 164: Add Instrumentation to L304
PTR 165/TR-GN9-0013: SCRAM Reset Not Working
PTR 166: Increase Size of File Extension Buffers
PTR 167: SDM Channel Control Word Corruption
PTR 170: DDBC Auto Input Error
PTR 154/TR-GN9-0005: JTIDS File Write Malfunction
PTR 166: Increase Size of File Extension Buffers
PTR 171/TR-GN9-0030: DX Program Halt
PTR 172: J9/N9 DOX Counts for SP103 7410 Board
PTR xxx: SDM Debug Code in All IO Devices
PTR 152/TR-GN9-0029: EMDU Display Freeze
PTR 173/TR-GN9-0033/TR-GN9-0034: MTU NG Occasionally
Displayed/DDBC Problem
PTR 174: IO Device Cleanup After SDM FPGA Fix
PTR 175: Need to Save Original Value on IFPM Interface Register
PTR 172: J9/N9 DOX Counts for SP103 7410 Board
PTR 176: Deletion of .DX1 Files on Card Takes Too Long
PTR 177: New OpenDir Function Does Not Work on All Formatted
Cards
PTR 178: Cannot Boot From Bottom Slot in V1.4
PTR 179: Test Function
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TABLE A-3: Continued

MCR
VERSION
1.5

DATE
12/17/03

1.5.0.AH

01/21/04

1.5.0.AI

01/27/04

1.5.0.AJ

02/05/04

1.6.0.AK

02/18/04

1.6.0.AL

03/03/04

1.6.1.AM
1.6.2.AM
1.6.3.AM

03/04/04
03/08/04
03/11/04

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES
PTR 180/TR-GN9-0007: Illegal Load Code not Functioning
PTR 181/TR-GN9-0010: Manual Off-Line Operates Different than
Legacy
PTR 182/TR-GN9-0023: Default Manually Activated Tests Not Reset
on CCP 100
PTR 183/TR-GN9-0027: PDS Load Interrupt Anomalies
PTR 190/TR-GN9-0041: FIP Serial Report Loop Test Error Msg
PTR 196/TR-GN9-0042: PDS System Load Problems
PTR 184/TR-GJ9-0002: Data Save File Corruption
PTR 187: Auto Data Save Timeout on a Restore
PTR 188: EHSP Program Hung At Location 0x40 After Data Save
Restore
PTR 191: Incorporate Fault Reset Switch
PTR 192: Tie the WRA Fault Light to the CCP Malfunction Panel
PTR 193: Default Auto Save to "ON"
PTR 197: Failed load should display a "=06" in CCP
PTR 198: Corrupted Error Display List on CCP in Fault Mode
PTR 149/TR-GJ9-0004: CP Status Reset Halts Program with Large
Track Load
PTR 203/TR-GJ9-0005: ADU System Reset Halts Program
PTR 196/TR-GN9-0042: PDS System Load Problems
PTR 203/TR-GN9-0045: Computer Clear Halts Program During Max
Load Condition
PTR 196/TR-GN9-0042: PDS System Load Problems
Blue Sheet G0032/PTR 207: DX Not Reporting all ACNs
PTR 155/TR-GN9-0003: Program Loops when Extracting LK-16 DX
to Vax Port
PTR 202/TR-GN9-0017: MCR Configuration Display
PTR 207/TR-GN9-0048: Data Save Corruption Halt
PTR 199: Fault Mode Does Not Check For Valid Load Codes
PTR 200: Not All Program Loads Generate a 946 Fault Queue Error If
Load Does Not Exist
PTR 201: Backup OFP load
PTR 213: Data Save Inoperable If Card Becomes Full While DXing
PTR 214: DX Drive Number on ADU Does Not Work
PTR 215: Combination of DX and Tape Switches
PTR 220: DX Process Too Slow
PTR 224: Remove Proprietary Include Files
PTR 225: Alternate DX Card Truncates Data Upon Termination
PTR 227: SCSI Target Options Need Set to 8-bit Transfers
PTR 231: System Halts on Remove Backup on Bottom Slot
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TABLE A-3: Continued

MCR
VERSION
1.7.0.AN

DATE
03/22/04

1.7.1.AO

03/31/04

1.7.2.AO

04/08/04

1.7.3.AP

05/27/04

1.7.4.AQ

06/01/04

1.7.5.AQ

06/02/04

1.7.5.AR
1.7.5.AS
1.7.5.AT

06/18/04
09/1/04
10/4/04

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES
PTR 216/TR-GN9-0044: AUTO SAVE OP ERROR Problem
PTR 217/TR-GN9-0046/: DX Write Error to RMSS upon EOT Using
30 DER Entry
TR-GN9-0047: No ADU System Alerts Displayed During DX
Capacity Extension Test
PTR 218: DX Write Error Should Terminate DX Session
PTR 219: Data Save Does Not Always Write To Boot Slot
PTR 233: Additional SCSI Target Options
PTR 234: Updated MCR Version for V1.7.0
PTR 209: Add System Test back into FIP
PTR 229/Blue Sheet G0036: System Time on Resets
PTR 239/ TR-GN9-0053: Anomalies after Loading from a Data Save
File
PTR 240/TR-GN9-0054: System Reset after Loading from Data Save
Halts Program
PTR 242: Updated MCR Version for V1.7.1
PTR 206/Blue Sheet G0033: Enhance Performance for Zeroize
Function
PTR 243: MISSION DX Function Gives NO UNIT alert
PTR 244: CCP Message Codes Not Output if 200 List is Active and
Shows ===
PTR 246: Problems with RMSS Access Lights and Operator Data
PTR 251: DX Task Crash with Data Save and DX Running at Max
Rate
PTR 252/Blue Sheet G0095: No GPS Indications When Tactical
Program is Loaded
PTR 209: FIP System Test
PTR 253/Blue Sheet G0094: Default Data Save to OFF
PTR 254: Remove DX Throttle Thunk
PTR 246: Problems with RMSS Access Lights and Operator Data
PTR 257: Geo, I, and JTIDS File Writes With Filename Do Not
Rename Properly
PTR 260/Blue Sheets G0012, G0043, G0109: Unable to Hook Tracks
PTR 204/Blue Sheet G0027/TR-GN9-0040: PDS DedBITE Fails
PTR 267/Blue Sheet G0027/TR-GN9-0040: PDS DedBITE Fails
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APPENDIX B: DATA EXTRACTION

TABLE B-1: DATA EXTRACTION POINTS AND DESCRIPTIONS

Data
Point
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Name
TK FILE
RPT BFR
IIP IN
DP IN
INT FILE
L11 RCV
L11 XMIT
L4A-V0
PDS TK
NAV IN
IIP OUT
CORREL
NAV TBL
ACMACS
PDS IN
PDS OUT

16

ARRAY

17

OP ACT

18
19

NAV OUT
DP OUT

20

MISSION

21
22
23
24
25
26
27

RESERVED
L4A+V0
UNUSED
LATR
POS TBL
L16 IN
L16 OUT

28

DDBC 1

29

DDBC 0

Parameter
Results of track computation on each track, each scan.
Results of EHSP, buffer Radar and IFF association.
IIF to MCR messages.
Radar to MCR messages.
Results of intercept program, each intercept, and scan.
Link 11 messages received.
Link 11 messages transmitted.
L4A I/O buffer with V.0 messages.
PDS track file items every track.
INS, ADC reports once per scan.
MCR to IIP messages.
Data used by correlation program & corresponding results.
All navigation parameters.
ACM / ACS emitter file parametric data.
PDS to MCR messages.
MCR to PDS messages.
Track array items that support testing of non-tracking
functions (PDS, displays).
Operator actions; ID’s the function activated on matrix
switches.
Primary navigation parameters & INS update table.
All MCR to DP messages.
Selected track file data including Own ship lat/long
(sampled once every 6 scans).
L4A with V.0; I/O buffer with no messages.
Unused.
O/S position & coordination conversion parameter table.
Link 16 messages received.
Link 16 message transmitted.
All messages received on the Navigation & JTIDS buses,
after DDBC processing.
All MCR messages output to DDBC for processing as
output messages on the Navigation & JTIDS buses.
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